Abstract In this study, a certified plutonium metal reference material (CRM 126) with a known production history is examined using analytical methods that are commonly employed in nuclear forensics for provenancing and attribution. The measured plutonium isotopic composition and actinide assay are consistent with values reported on the reference material certificate. Model ages from U/Pu and Am/Pu chronometers agree with the documented production timeline. The results confirm the utility of these analytical methods and highlight the importance of a holistic approach for forensic study of unknown materials.
Introduction
Forensic analysis of interdicted nuclear material relies on a wide variety of analytical techniques to establish material provenance, history, and intended use. The field of nuclear forensics developed rapidly following the end of the Cold War in 1991 in response to the need for rapid and accurate diagnostic information of seized nuclear material. Despite decades of developmental efforts, relatively few nuclear forensic validation studies focus on plutonium (Pu) samples. Most examine samples of bulk uranium (metal or oxide) either as primitive ores/ore concentrates or as mature uranium (U) oxide fuel. Wallenius and Mayer [1] and Chen et al. [2] highlight the application and utility of Pu chronometry on various samples of known and unknown origin. Wallenius et al. [3] focus on the characteristics that different reactor types impart upon the relative abundance of Pu isotopes owing to different neutron spectra and starting materials. Moody [4] offered a broad approach to derive chronometric and reactor information that included analysis of activation products and their progeny, as well analysis of fission products. All of these studies demonstrate the limited utility of individual attributes for forensic determination of process history, and highlight the need for a multi-faceted analytical approach for attribution of unknown Pu materials.
Plutonium represents only a small fraction of cases involving interdiction of nuclear material (between 1993 and 2006 only 4 of 275 cases of illicit trafficking/activities involved Pu) [5] . From a national security perspective, it is of extreme importance to be able to evaluate the characteristics and provenance of interdicted Pu with a high degree of confidence.
Plutonium metal potentially carries signatures from processes ranging from initial production to final purification [3, 6] . The isotopic composition of a sample of Pu reflects the conditions of the reactor irradiation in which it was formed (e.g., neutron spectrum and energy profile), the material from which the Pu was formed (fuel type), and the time since it was produced in a reactor [4] . The presence of contaminants potentially reflects the chemistry of processing that purified the Pu from the irradiated fuel or intentionally added alloy constituents. Lastly, the ingrowth of Pu progeny can be used to estimate the timing of Pu chemical purification from its daughters. Thorough chemical investigation of a Pu sample provides clues about each & Benjamin L. Byerly benbyerly@gmail.com of the above processes and can ultimately help determine its provenance, history, and intended use. In 2013, two tubes of Pu metal certified reference material (CRM), CRM 126, were recovered from archives at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) for chemical analysis as part of a forensics test case. The purpose of the test case was to exercise a wide variety of analytical methods relevant to nuclear forensics on a Pu metal with known chemical composition and provenance. This allows for comparison of the chemical signatures measured in the sample with those known to be imparted by the specific manufacturing processes. The study demonstrates the use of several forensic techniques and highlights the utility of various characteristics for determining process history (e.g., origin, purification scheme, metal production method, production timeline).
Background of CRM metals and a documented history of CRM 126
The rapid development of United States atomic energy programs in the 1940s resulted in a need for new analytical capabilities and appropriate certified and traceable U and Pu assay standards. Thus, in 1949, New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) was established in New Brunswick, New Jersey (NBL later moved to a location near Argonne National Laboratory, Illinois) as a metallurgy lab to produce and distribute reference materials for actinide assay and isotopic composition, the key attributes in different matrices for international safeguards and other applications. The National Bureau of Standards (NBS; now the National Institute for Standards and Technology, NIST) was responsible for certifying these materials and establishing traceability. Among the first standard reference materials (SRMs) prepared from this effort was a highpurity Pu metal, issued as NBS Standard Sample 949a [7] . As supplies were consumed, new high-purity Pu metal standards were periodically prepared, certified, and issued (Standard Reference Materials, or SRM, 949b-f).
In 1982, a joint effort between LANL and NBL was established for the preparation and analysis of the seventh issue (to be SRM 949g) of the 949 series of Pu metal reference materials. New Brunswick Laboratory became the certifying authority for nuclear reference materials and issued the seventh of the 949 series of Pu metals under the name CRM 126 because only NBS (now NIST) can use the term Standard Reference Material (SRM). Laboratory records indicate the following: Pu feed material (metal) was shipped to LANL from Hanford in the late 1970s. By 1983, a batch of highly purified electrorefined Pu metal had been prepared and packaged [8] . The sample package consisted of single *1 g pieces sealed in glass tubes in a dry argon atmosphere (Fig. 1) . Historical records suggest that approximately 300 tubes were produced and 229 were shipped to NBL to be sold as a Pu assay standard. The remainder were either rejected due to observed oxide formation due to an incomplete glass seal or retained for chemical characterization. Chemical characterization (isotopic and impurity assay) was complete in time for the CRM certificate of analysis to be issued with an October 1, 1985 certificate date [9] .
Analytical methods
Non-destructive assays (NDA), which are essentially the first step in any nuclear forensic investigation, were carried out on the solid samples as received in the original ampoules. Overall Pu concentration, Pu isotopic composition, 241 Am concentration, and 237 Np concentration were determined using gamma-spectrometry with a high-purity germanium (HPGe) detector with the sample package positioned in a defined counting geometry. The acquired gamma spectral files were analyzed using fixed-energy, response function analysis with multiple efficiency (FRAM) and spectral nondestructive assay platform (SNAP; Eberline Services) codes, which were developed at LANL for international safeguards, material accountability, and processing applications [10, 11] . The gamma-ray spectroscopy used a coaxial electrically cooled 40 % relative efficiency high-purity germanium (HPGe) detector (Model GMX40P, ORTEC, USA) with a beryllium end window. The resolution (FWHM) for the detector was 1.90 keV at 1.33 MeV. The detector system was energy and peak resolution calibrated using NIST traceable Ho-166 m calibration source procured from Eckert & Ziegler Analytics (Atlanta, GA). Following preliminary NDA, the original sealed glass ampoules were scored to break open. Two samples of CRM 126 were extracted from their respective ampoules, weighed, polished with a clean stainless steel wire brush and reweighed (Fig. 2) . Following sample polishing to remove oxides formed on the exterior of the samples, they were weighed and dissolved in 6 M hydrochloric acid (HCl, Optima grade; Fisher Scientific). Following dissolution, samples were diluted to *5 mg sample/g solution, aliquoted, and distributed to different sample areas for destructive analysis. The destructive analytical methods utilized in this study are described below; additional details can be found in Tandon et al. [12, 13] and Spencer et al. [14] .
Plutonium content was determined using controlled potential coulometry (CPC) based on measuring the number of electrons required to oxidize Pu in a carefully weighed sample [15, 16] . In this method, Pu is oxidized from the ?3 to the ?4 state, and the electrical current generated by the oxidation is measured. The purity of the Pu is then calculated from the integrated current as a function of time, sample weight, and chemical calibration factor using Faraday's law. The analysis is calibrated against CRM 126a, a Pu assay CRM previously prepared by LANL and certified by NBL and with an in-house PuO 2 standard that has been run against SRM 949f and CRM 126a. Iron (Fe) interferes with the assay of Pu, and so assay results must be corrected for the presence of Fe. The Fe content of the sample was measured using visible spectrophotometry with a Thermo Fisher G10S spectrophotometer. Sample size for CPC analysis was *5-7 mg.
Uranium content was determined by isotope dilution mass spectrometry (IDMS) using a 233 U spike. Uranium (*20 lg) was separated from Pu (*20 mg cut) using Lewatit MP 5080 (Bayer AG) ion exchange resin [17] [18] [19] . Following separation, U was measured on single rhenium filaments via ion counting in a Daly collector in peak hopping mode on a VG-3 (Sector 54, VG Instruments, now Isotopx, UK) thermal ionization mass spectrometer (TIMS). The average U blank was 295 pg.
Uranium isotopic composition was determined by thermal ionization mass spectrometry. Approximately 25 lg U was separated from a 25 mg Pu cut. Separated U was loaded (*5 ng) onto single rhenium filaments and measured by ion counting similar to the IDMS measurements. Trace metals were measured by ICP-MS and ICP-AES using a PlasmaQuad 2 (VG Elemental, now Thermo Scientific, USA) and an Ultima 2 (Jobin-Yvon, now Horiba Scientific, Japan), respectively. Prior to analysis by ICP-AES, trace metals were separated from Pu using AG-MP-1 (Bio-Rad, USA) anion exchange resin, typically using 200-250 mg of Pu metal. Quantitative recovery of each element is monitored by using spiked, matrix-matched standards. Elemental analyses by ICP-MS are performed on dissolved Pu metal (typically *25 mg) that has been diluted to 250 ppm Pu for analysis.
Custom multi-element impurity standard calibration standards (10 lg/mL) are procured from Inorganic Ventures. The PlasmaQuad 2 is calibrated by preparing 10 mL dilutions of the calibration standards at 20 and 100 ppb. Three internal standards (Sc, Rh and Tm) that account for instrument drift and Pu matrix effects are added to blanks, standards, and samples at concentration of 100 ppb. Calibration check standards are procured from a different vendor (Spex Certiprep) at a concentration of 10 lg/mL. An initial calibration verification (ICV) and a continuing calibration verification (CCV) are prepared in 10 mL volume at a concentration of 50 ppb. An initial calibration blank (ICB) and a continuing calibration blank (CCB) are also prepared. The ICB and the CCB have no analytes added and contain only the internal standards. The ICV and ICB are run immediately following the instrument calibration standards.
The recoveries of two types of spikes were evaluated for QC purposes for both ICP-MS and ICP-AES: a matrix spike and a post-dissolution spike. The matrix spike was prepared by adding a known amount of multi-element standards into a separate sample prior to dissolution. The post-dissolution spike sample was prepared by the addition of known amount of trace element standards into a dissolved sample following separation (ICP-AES) or dilution (ICP-MS). Each are analyzed as separate samples. The results of the matrix spike were used to monitor the trace element recovery for the entire process. The results from the post-dissolution spike were used to monitor the trace element recovery at the level of the diluted sample matrix or from the post column separation solution. The tolerance levels for recovery of the matrix spike and post-dissolution spike are 25 and 20 %, respectively. These tolerance values were not exceeded during this study.
Following dissolution,
241
Am and
237
Np analyses were performed by alpha and gamma counting using a Protean Instruments Model WPC9550 gas-proportional automatic gross alpha counter and Perkin-Elmer Quantum 5003 Cobra automatic NaI(Tl) gross gamma counter. The gasproportional counter measures the overall alpha activity of a deposited portion of a diluted aliquot of the sample solution and the NaI(Tl) counter measures the 241 Am activity of the same diluted aliquot using the 59.5 keV gamma emission. The calibration of both the gas-proportional and NaI (Tl) gamma counter is performed annually using well-characterized Pu and 241 Am materials and can be verified using commercially prepared standards. The 237 Np analyses were performed on dissolved portions of the sample material. This method concentrates the 237 Np using cation exchange chromatography (BioRad AG 50w X4 200-400 mesh) followed by solvent extraction using 2-thenoyltrifluoroacetone (TTA) in methylbenzoate to separate the trace neptunium (Np) from the Pu. The 237 Np recovery is corrected using a 239 Np internal standard that is eluted from a 243 Am loaded column (BioRad AG 50w X4 200-400 mesh). The 239 Np internal standard is measured using a manual NaI(Tl) gamma counter and the separated 237 Np activity is determined using a gas-proportional counter. Any remaining Pu alpha activity in the Np separated aliquot is corrected for using alpha spectrometry. The 239 Np internal standard recovery and 237 Np/Pu alpha corrections are relative measures that do not require detector efficiency calibrations.
With the exception of the gamma data, all of the data presented here are ISO GUM compliant at a coverage factor of k = 2. The FRAM software which was used to process gamma-ray spectra for Pu isotopics was initially developed before GUM Workbench was published. The FRAM reported result uncertainties are primarily based on nuclear counting statistics and may not incorporate all possible uncertainty contributors in a manner fully consistent with the GUM.
Results and discussion
Isotope composition of CRM 126 and the utility of multiple chronometers
The measured Pu and U isotope compositions of CRM 126 are given in Tables 1 and 2 , respectively. The U isotope composition is corrected for a 295 pg blank in the 25 lg U present in the aliquot for U isotope analysis. The isotope composition of the U blank is given in Table 2 . The U blank quantity and isotope composition was estimated by the weighted average of four blank measurements taken before, during, and after the study. Only the 238 U/ 235 U was significantly affected by the blank correction (from 238 U/ 235 U measured of 0.000141 to 238 U/ 235 U corrected of 0.000129). Uncertainties associate with the blank correction were determined like all other data using GUM Workbench and are reported at a coverage factor of k = 2.
Total actinide contents are given in Table 3 . The actinide contents measured in this study closely agree with ingrowth corrected informational (not certified) values provided with the certificate for CRM 126. The measured Pu isotopic compositions also broadly agree with informational values provided in the CRM 126 certificate, which, however, are neither certified nor associated with uncertainty. The results from non-destructive gamma analysis, which was used as pre-screening technique, generally agree with the results from destructive analysis. Pu which makes measurement of these isotopes difficult by gamma counting [22] .
Ingrowth of radiogenic daughters allows the determination of a model age of last purification of decay products from bulk parent material. In the case of Pu materials, the daughter products of interest are 234 U, 235 U, 236 U, 237 Np, 238 U, and 241 Am [1] . The model ages that are determined from parent daughter ratios represent the maximum time since last purification of the daughters from the parents. For Pu material, this is considered to be the timing of purification during reprocessing [23] . An important assumption made when calculating model ages using the Bateman equation [24] is that there is no daughter present initially, at t = 0 (i.e., all of the daughter isotope present is the result of radiogenic ingrowth). Additionally, it is assumed that the system has neither gained nor lost either parent or daughter atoms such that the daughter-parent ratio changes only as a result of radioactive decay (closed system) [25] .
Model ages of CRM 126 are presented in Pu is *2 9 10 -8
* Corrected for blank contribution
Average blank was 295 pg (n = 4). For this study there was *25 lg U per aliquot for U isotopic analysis Pu chronometer disagrees with the other chronometers and the documented age of CRM 126. This is not surprising, however, considering the nature of the isotopes of interest. A useful discussion of apparent mismatches among Pu chronometers is presented in Sturm et al. [23] , which we will briefly discuss here. The 238 U/ 242 Pu system suffers from several setbacks to its utility as a chronometer. 242 Pu has a long half-life relative to the other Pu isotopes, thus ingrowth of 238 U is slow relative to other U isotopes. Additionally, in CRM 126, like many low burnup Pu materials, the abundance of 242 Pu is very low. Lastly, the daughter isotope, 238 U, is the most abundant isotope of natural U (*99.27 %). Therefore, contamination from natural U, either inherent to the material or introduced during the analytical process, will affect the 238 U/ 242 Pu chronometer. The presence of excess daughter isotope will yield anomalously old ages (e.g., [6000 years for CRM 126).
Despite the discordant ages, useful information can be gleaned from the 238 
Estimating plutonium production reactor source
Manmade production of Pu began in 1940 [27] and continues to this day in nuclear reactors across the world. Variations in fuel type, reactor type, and irradiation conditions impart the isotopic signatures on Pu that comes out of a reactor [28] . Wallenius et al. [3] cite two common characteristics of different irradiation conditions (1) increased formation of 238 Pu associated with relative 235 U enrichment and (2) reduced relative production of highermass Pu isotopes due to hardening of the neutron spectrum. It is theoretically possible to pinpoint the type of reactor in which Pu was produced. Several studies have applied statistical methods (e.g., factor analysis, principal component analysis) to determine the origin of unknown irradiated fuel [29] [30] [31] . Low burnup Pu production is of particular interest from a safeguards perspective due to its attractiveness as a fissile material for possible defense related applications. Unfortunately, at low burnup many of these signatures are more difficult to differentiate among reactor types. Table 5 provides a summary of countries known to have participated in low burnup Pu production. Note the similarities in general design amongst the different reactors.
Aside from shipping records that indicate the source metal for CRM 126 possibly came from Hanford in the late 1970s, there is no information identifying the reactor in which it was produced. Because it was shipped from Hanford it was likely produced in one of the graphite reactors sited there; B-, D-, F-, H-, DR-, C-, KW-, KE-, and N-reactors were all in operation prior to the late 1970s or early 1980s [32] . Production at a Savannah River Site reactor cannot be entirely excluded, however.
Assuming production in a graphite reactor, it is possible to estimate when the Pu source material was irradiated. Toffer and Kupinski [33] and Kinderman et al. [34] provide data on spent fuel originating from several Hanford graphite reactors including B, KE, and KW which can be used to estimate relative Pu isotope production (Fig. 3) . A second-degree polynomial regression of the low burnup (\6 % 240 Pu) data from Hanford (Fig. 3) 
Plutonium reprocessing and metal production
The CRM 126 Pu metal is extremely pure ([99 % Pu). Notable non-actinide impurities are Mn, Fe, Ga, Ta, and W ( Table 6) . As discussed below, these may represent impurities introduced during either reprocessing or metal production. Actinide (U, Np, Am) concentrations in CRM 126 are also generally low and primarily reflect ingrowth since initial purification. 
The composition of example electrorefined metals from the LANL and Rocky Flats (RF) Pu production facilities are given for comparison (data from [57, 58] There are three general techniques that were commonly used on large scales for separating Pu from irradiated U: solvent extraction, ion exchange, and precipitation [35] . Early efforts for recovery of Pu for production purposes utilized precipitation methods; Hanford's T and B-plants used the bismuth phosphate process [36] . Solvent extraction methods such as Hexone/Redox were also utilized at Hanford, but ultimately the PUREX process became the method of choice for the US and many other countries for large-scale Pu recovery [28, [37] [38] [39] [40] . Each of these processes can impart unique trace element signatures on to their products. For example, Al, Zr, Nb, and Ce are typically detectable in Redox products, and Zr, Tc, Ru, Th, Np, Am, Cm are commonly detectable in PUREX products [41] [42] [43] [44] . These impurities, except Np and Am, are not present in CRM 126 in detectible quantities and are therefore of limited use for estimating the mode by which the Pu was separated from its U fuel source.
The metal contaminants present in CRM 126 may instead reflect impurities introduced through the metal production process. Plutonium metal production in United States facilities has undergone numerous changes over the past 40 years, but has generally followed the same general scheme. Historically, Pu processing took place at four facilities in the United States nuclear complex: the Hanford Site, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Rocky Flats Plant, and the Savannah River Site. Once the Pu is extracted from the fuel per processes described above it can be converted to metal either through direct oxide reduction (DOR) or by PuF 4 bomb reduction [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] . The DOR process involves reduction of PuO 2 in a mixture with CaCl 2 salt at high temperature. The mixing takes place in a magnesia crucible with a tantalum stirrer at approximately 800°C [50] . This process does not provide significant decontamination of trace metals or other actinides such as Am, Np, and U, and also introduces contaminants such as Mg, Ta, Ca, Ni, and W from the reagents and equipment into the metal product. The bomb reduction process converts PuO 2 to PuF 4 followed by reduction to Pu metal [51, 52] . Like DOR, the bomb reduction process does not provide much decontamination of impurities present in the PuO 2 feed [53] .
Following conversion to Pu metal, additional steps can be applied to achieve the purity needed for specific uses. If the metal contains high ([1000 ppm) concentrations of americium (Am) then a molten-salt extraction process (MSE) can be used to accomplish removal of *90 % of the feed Am [45, 54, 55] . The MSE process uses a KClNaCl eutectic salt with MgCl 2 to oxidize the Am. Mixing is performed in the same apparatus as DOR. It does not remove significant quantities of contaminants other than Am, and to a lesser extent, U. Following reduction or MSE, the Pu metal can be used for various applications or put through additional purification steps. One such purification step, electrorefining (ER), involves oxidizing Pu from the impure metal feed at an anode followed by reduction at a cathode [50, 56] . The product is a highly pure metal with sub-ppm concentrations of the majority of trace metals [57] . Notable exceptions are U, Am, and Np as the product metal commonly contains 10-20 % of the feed concentration of these elements [56, 58] as well as tantalum and tungsten (both components of the ER apparatus) which are present at tens of ppm levels. Despite this, the concentrations of these elements are reduced to a few tens of ppm in the product metal. Plutonium concentration in the ER product is commonly [99.90 wt% [59] .
It appears likely that the trace metal impurities present in CRM 126 are the result of contamination introduced during efforts to purify the Pu metal. Records indicate that CRM 126 was electrorefined following conversion to metal [8] . The Ta and W contents of CRM 126 are typical of ER metals, and probably reflect contamination from the ER apparatus. The Fe, Mn, and Cr impurities, which are also commonly found in ER metals, may reflect the use of stainless steel parts throughout reprocessing [60] .
Conclusions
Here we demonstrate the results of a forensic investigation into the origin of a Pu metal sample. In this instance, the production history of the sample (issued by NBL as a certified Pu metal reference material, CRM 126) is known; the metal was electrorefined and packaged at Los Alamos National Laboratory in the early 1980s. The documented process history provides a means of evaluating the forensic characterization applied to the sample. The actinide content, trace metal content, and Pu purity are consistent with those of an electrorefined Pu metal and quite similar to other electrorefined Pu metals produced by LANL and elsewhere. The U/Pu and Am/Pu chronometers yield model ages that overlap with the with the documented production age. A 241 Am reactor model age suggests an irradiation date sometime between 1953 and 1959. These results provide validation of the utility of a multifaceted forensic investigation of nuclear material.
